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Abstract
This paper seeks to outline the legislative and judicial history of the Affordable Care Act’s
contraception coverage mandate. It begins by explaining the justifications and specifications of
the provision. It then highlights the three phases of litigation that have surrounded the mandate:
closely held, for-profit companies; religious nonprofit organizations; and state attorney generals.
This paper provides context for the litigation by describing the opposing stances towards the
mandate of the Obama and Trump Administrations and the different modifications to the
provision made under each administration. In the wake of last week’s finalization of the
controversial rules the Trump Administration issued, this paper dissects lingering judicial
questions about the mandate that are sure to resurface in coming litigation. Finally, I conclude
with an urge for the reader to consider if women’s health is being granted the status it deserves.

On March 23, 2010, as President
Barack Obama signed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)
into law, one has to wonder if he knew
of the legal challenges in its future, or of
the efforts of the future Administration to
dismantle the legislation that defined his
tenure as President. Nevertheless, since
its enactment, the ACA has been subject
to a slew of litigation and torrents of criticism from the Republican Party. One of
the provisions that has proven to be the
most controversial is the mandate that
health insurance plans cover the full cost
of Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
approved contraceptive methods (Law et
al., 2016), which has inspired hundreds of
employers to file suit in federal court on the
basis of infringement of religious freedom.
The policies of the Trump Administration
have sought to protect these plaintiffs by
expanding exemptions to employers who
object to providing birth control, but have
likewise motivated lawsuits of their own.
This paper seeks to review thehistory and
content of the litigation surrounding the
contraception mandate; further, it will highlight lingering judicial questions on the matter and discuss potential arguments that
should arise in future rounds oflitigation.

Background of Policy:
The Affordable Care Act
Upon the passage of the ACA
in 2010, women’s preventive care was
deemed a primary priority. The essential
components of preventive care were enumerated by the Institute of Medicine (IOM),
which advised the government to require,
among other provisions, private health insurance plans to cover all FDA-approved
44
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contraceptive methods without cost sharing. The IOM (2011) concluded that free
availability to birth control is required to
“ensure women’s health and well-being”
(pg. 1). Prior to the ACA, birth control coverage was widely present in private health
insurance plans; however, it was not universal, nor did it come without cost- sharing (Sobel, Salganicoff, & Gomez, 2018).
Since the passage of the ACA, millions of
women have benefited from the contraception mandate; a report from the IMS Institute for Healthcare Informatics revealed
that 5.1 million women in 2013 received
oral contraceptives with no copay, compared to just 1.2 million in 2012 (Burke &
Simmons, 2014).
However, public comments on the
potential for the mandate to infringe upon
employers’ religious freedoms led federal
agencies to incorporate both an exemption and accommodation into the provision
(Salganicoff, 2016). That is, employers that
were distinctly religious (i.e., a church) were
altogether exempt from the mandate; other non-profit religious organizations with
religious objections could qualify for an
accommodation, in which insurers or plan
administrators would provide contraception to employees, and employers would
not be“required to contract, arrange, pay,
or refer for contraceptive coverage” (Birth
Control Benefits, n.d., n.p.). Yet, the accommodation was not extensive enough
for two different sects of opposition, for
two distinct reasons: for-profit companies,
which could not qualify for the accommodation and demanded to; and religious
nonprofits, which argued they were entitled to a full exemption (Salganicoff, 2016).
These two streams of opposition were
manifested in high-profile lawsuits; they
will be discussed in the following section.
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Litigation and Adjustments Under the
Obama Administration
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
The owners of Hobby Lobby are
the devoutly evangelical David and Barbara Green, who have incorporated religious
practices into their business; Hobby Lobby’s purpose statement includes “honoring the Lord in all we do by operating the
company in a manner consistent with Biblical principles” (Hobby Lobby, n.d., n.p.).
Because the Greens believe life begins at
conception, they oppose four of the contraceptive methods on the FDA-approved list,
as they might prevent the implantation of a
fertilized egg. These four methods include
two methods of emergency contraception
and two types of intrauterine devices (Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 2014). Yet, due to the
contraception mandate, the Greens were
required by law to provide these methods
to their employees. Because Hobby Lobby is a for-profit corporation, it was not
entitled to either the exemption or the accommodation. Thus, in 2012, Hobby Lobby filed suit against the provision, which
was later heard and decided by the United
States Supreme Court (Duke,2015). On
June 30, 2014, the Supreme Court ruled
in favor of Hobby Lobby, upholding its right
to an accommodation on the basis of the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)
(Religious Exemptions, 2017). The RFRA
bars the government from “substantially
burdening” free exercise of religion through
regulations or penalties, unless it is doing
so to advance a “compelling government
interest,” and is employing the least restrictive approach to do so (Stahl & Lynch,
2017). Following this decision, the Obama
administration altered its policies, allowing
46
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closely- held, for-profit businesses to qualify for the accommodation; a closely-held
corporation is one that “is not a nonprofit;
has no publicly traded ownership interests;
and has more than 50% of the value of its
ownership interest owned directly or indirectly by 5 or fewer individuals” (Sobel, Salganicoff, & Gomez, 2018, n.p.).
Zubik v. Burwell
The accommodation was not sufficient for some religiously affiliated nonprofits
that already qualified for it. Across the nation, nonprofits began filing suit, arguing that
the accommodation, while removing their
responsibility to pay for the birth control,
did not protect them from complicity in supplying contraceptive methods that violated
their religious beliefs (Salganicoff, 2016). Of
the suits, seven were consolidated into Zubik v. Burwell and heard before the United
States Supreme Court.
As in Hobby Lobby, the plaintiffs in
Zubik cited the RFRA in their opposition to
the contraceptive mandate (Sobel, Salganicoff, & Gomez, 2018). They claimed that
the accommodation substantially burdened
their free practice of religion, as “the contraceptive coverage is ‘triggered’ by their notice, and the insurer or third party administrator utilizes their employer plan to provide
the objectionable coverage” (Salganicoff,
2016, n.p.). The “notice” the plaintiffs were
referring to was the paperwork they had to
submit that stipulated their objection to providing contraceptive coverage (Salganicoff,
2016). After hearing oral arguments, the
Supreme Court issued a per curiam opinion
on May 16, 2016, remanding the decision
back to the lower courts, imploring the parties involved to devise a scheme that balances freedom of religion with the seamless
provision of contraceptives (Zubik v. Burwell, 2016). On January 9, 2017, the DeUMURJ | Volume III | Spring 2019

partment of Health and Human Services issued a statement saying it had been unable
over the past year to conceive of such a
compromise (Religious Exemptions, 2017);
nine months later, it dramatically changed
course, with the publication of the Trump
Administration’s Interim Final Guidelines.

New Guidelines of the Trump
Administration
The inaugural year of the Trump Administration came with an executive aboutface on women’s contraceptive access. In
October of 2017, the Departments of Health
and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury issued an Interim Final Rule (IFR) on religious exemptions and accommodations for
the contraceptive mandate under the ACA.
The purpose of issuing the new rules was
to drastically extend the exemption in both
scope and justification. Under the rules, the
exemption applied to nonprofit and for-profit
employers, insurers, and private universities
or colleges that had a religious objection to
the coverage. Most radically, the rules also
extended the exemption to nonprofit or
closely held for-profit employers, insurers,
and private colleges or universities with just
a moral objection to contraceptives. Theaccommodation still exists; however, it is
now merely offered as an option to those
employers who qualify for an exemption already (Birth Control Benefits, n.d.; California
v. HHS, 2017; Religious Exemptions, 2017;
Sobel, Salgnicoff, & Gomez, 2018). Suddenly, the tables had turned; those champions of the increased access to birth control under the Obama Administration found
themselves filing suits against the Trump Administration, which had completely inverted
the executive stance on the mandate. As a
judge in a subsequent lawsuit on the matter
wrote in his opinion, the Interim Final Rules
“represent an abandonment of the [DepartGrant, The Case for Contraceptives

ments’] prior position with regard to the
contraceptive coverage requirement, and
a reversal of their approach to striking the
proper balance between substantial governmental and societal interests” (California
v. HHS, 2017,pg.2).

The New Face of Litigation Under
Trump
Nearly immediately following the
publication of the IFR, a group of Democratic state attorneys from eight states and
four nonprofits filed suit in federal court
(Hackman, 2017), alleging the new rules
infringe upon the Civil Rights Act and the
First Amendment (Carter, 2017). Washington Attorney General Bob Ferguson, one
of the plaintiffs, writes, “The Civil Rights Act
prohibits discrimination against women
based on sex or the capacity to be pregnant.
The rules result in women having
less access to reproductive health care,
which is discrimination based on their
gender” (Carter, 2017, n.p.). Two cases
in the federal district courts of California
and Pennsylvania resulted in the judges
issuing preliminary injunctions, effectively
preventing the IFR from going into effect
(Keith, 2018). Both of these cases have
been appealed to their respective circuit
courts, and will likely advance to the U.S.
Supreme Court (Sobel, Salganicoff, & Gomez, 2018). Thus, the litigation enters into
its third phase, as the Government takes a
new side, and women’s access to contraceptives becomes subject to judges, presidents, employers, and bureaucrats.

IFR Finalized
Despite the surrounding judicial turmoil, on November 7, 2018, the Trump47
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administration finalized its IFR, effectively
extending the exemption to nearly any employer who can justify a moral aversion to
contraceptives. The Departments issued
the religious and moral exemptions separately, the first providing the exemption to
“entities that object to services covered by
the mandate on the basis of sincerely held
religious beliefs,” and the second providing
“protections to nonprofit organizations and
small businesses that have non-religious
moral convictions opposing services covered by the mandate” (U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services [HHS], 2018,
n.p.). The Departments emphasize that
the new procedures do not affect existing
government operations, such as community health centers, that issue free or subsidized contraceptive coverage to low-income women. Further, they claim that the
new exemptions “should affect no more
than approximately 200 employers with
religious or moral objections” (HHS, 2018,
n.p.).
Yet, it is clear that the fight is not
over. Proponents of seamless coverage
of birth control vow to see the provision
rectified by the court, and they reject the
statistic the Administration proposed that
claimed just 200 employers would be affected. Fatima Goss Graves, the president
of the National Women’s Law Center, has
spurned the new provisions, saying, “If the
Administration thinks it can move these
rules forward without a fight, they’re wrong.
Countless women depend on this critical
birth control coverage for their health and
economic stability— and we will continue to fiercely defend them” (Mosbergen,
2018, n.p.). As the battle over birth control
continues, it is important to consider the
judicial questions that remain unanswered,
the opposing statutes at play, and how legal arguments will evolve in the wake of
48
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the finalization of Trump’s rules. These will
be considered in the next section.

The Judicial Future of the Contraceptive
Coverage Mandate
As the new battle lines are drawn
between the Administration and religious or
“moral” employers, and those proponents
of seamless contraceptive coverage, it is
critical to define what precisely is coming
to a head. The Trump Administration and
its supporters have extended the exemption to objecting employers; opponents
claim this violates the First Amendment
and the Civil Rights Act. Champions of the
contraceptive movement would like to see
at the very least a compromise between
religious freedom and seamless contraception—hence, the accommodation
—but opponents claim any imposition of
the mandate violates the RFRA. Each of
these statutes comes with a myriad of constitutional interpretations and judicial precedent that will surely factor into the Supreme
Court’s ultimate decision, if and when it decides to hear the pending cases.

The Religious Freedom Restoration Act
First, it is imperative the Court address the lingering questions of the RFRA
that remain unresolved since Zubik. Recall
again the components of the RFRA, which
reads that the “Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of
religion” unless “it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person is in
furtherance of a compelling government
interest and is the least restrictive means
of furthering that compelling government
interest” (Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1993, 2018).

UMURJ | Volume III | Spring 2019

Does the accommodation substantially
burden the religious exercise of employers?
Prior to Zubik, over 100 nonprofit organizations claimed that the accommodation
to the contraceptive mandate does indeed
substantially burden their religious freedom
(Sobel, Salganicoff, & Gomez, 2018). The
Court, however, failed to endorse or refute
this position in Zubik (Epps, 2016), instead
taking a more practical approach, mandating the parties reach a compromise (Stahl
& Lynch, 2017), leaving the question unsettled. Moving forward, proponents of contraceptive coverage must either devise a superior compromise between the exemption
and the accommodation, convince the Supreme Court that the accommodation is not
a substantial burden to religiously objecting
employers, or convince the Supreme Court
that, although the accommodation may impose a substantial burden, it is justified by a
compelling government interest.
Does the government have a compelling interest in mandating employers
provide contraceptives against their religious beliefs? The Obama Administration
cited three primary compelling interests
in upholding the contraceptive mandate:
gender equality, female autonomy, and
public health. First, the Administration argued that access to contraceptive methods advanced gender equality by permitting women to control when they would
have a child and how many they would
have, thus allowing them to be equally involved and competitive in the workforce
(Stahl & Lunch, 2017). Further, the mandate allows women control over their own
bodies that is not subject to an employer’s
discretion. It also reduces the number of
unwanted pregnancies and diseases prevented by contraceptive methods, and is
Grant, The Case for Contraceptives

thus an important factor in the preservation public health (Sobel, Salganicoff, &
Gomez, 2018). In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
(2014), however, the Court decided such
generalities would be insufficient in future
cases, and instead the compelling interest
needed to be justified in requiring particular employers to provide contraceptives.
The Trump Administration, however, has been clear on its position that the
coverage of birth control does not serve a
compelling government interest. It points
to the millions of women enrolled in grandfathered plans, which are all legally exempt
from the contraceptive mandate (Religious
Exemptions, 2017). Further, it emphasizes
the existence of many federal, state, and
local programs that already provide free or
subsidized contraceptives for low-income
women, and argues, “the availability of
such programs to serve the most at-risk
women diminishes the Government’s interest in applying the Mandate to objecting
employers” (Religious Exemptions, 2017,
pg. 47803). In addition, the Departments
argue that imposing the contraceptive
mandateon objecting organizations will not
even benefit the women who are the most
prone to experiencing unplanned pregnancies—women who are unmarried, 1824 years old, low-income, lack education,
or are part of a minority group (Religious
Exemptions, 2017; Institute of Medicine,
2011). Thus, the Trump Administration argues, the compelling interest to impose
such a mandate on religiously or morally
objecting employers is lacking.
Is there a less restrictive way of ensuring women have access to free contraceptive methods without cost-sharing
than the accommodation?
In Zubik, the nonprofits claimed that
less restrictive ways to provide contraceptives to women existed, such as permitting
49
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these employees to receive subsidies on
the health insurance exchange to enroll in
acontraceptive-only plan, or by taking advantage of Title X, which provides federal funds for family planning. In response,
however, the Obama Administration contended that these methods would impose
“financial, logistical, informational, and administrative burdens” on women (Priests
for Life, et al. vs. HHS, 2014, pg. 66). In
a concurrence to the per curiam order in
Zubik, Justice Sotomayor points out that
such “contraceptive-only plans” are currently nonexistent and could even run contrary to federal law (Zubik v. Burwell, 2016).
The Court will either have to decide that
the accommodation is the least restrictive
way to provide seamless coverage without imposing disproportionate costs on
women, or the parties will once more be
called to devise a less restrictive method
that balances interests. I believe that such
a compromise could entail altering the
ACA requirements to remove mandatory
coverage of the copper intrauterine device, which is the only method of the four
alleged abortifacients that has been shown
to prevent the implantation of a fertilized
egg (Carmon,2014).

The Civil Rights Act and The Constitutionality of a “Moral Objection”
On the opposite side of the issue,
arguments remain to be fully shaped, as
the appellate cases have not yet been
heard. Yet, opponents’ strength should lie
in two primary arguments: the unconstitutionality of the so-called “moral” exemption, and the violation of the Civil Rights
Act on the basis of discrimination of sex.
First, opponents should argue that
the moral exemption is an attack on the
50
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First Amendment’s Establishment Clause,
which prohibits the government from enacting any law “respecting an establishment of religion” (Carlson, 2017). The Attorney General of California, who filed suit
under the interim rule, has contended that
the moral exemption is so broad that the
government is effectively favoring “one religion over another, or religion over
irreligion,” (Board of Education of Kiryas
Joel Village School District v. Grumet,
1994, pg. 703; Butash, 2017), which has
been prohibited by the Courts on the basis of the Establishment Clause. The ACLU
(n.d.) has likewise contended, “While religious freedom gives us all the right to our
beliefs, it doesn’t give institutions or individuals the right to impose their belief on
others or to discriminate” (n.p.). By making
the moral exemption so generalized, the
Government is unduly prioritizing the moral convictions of employers over women’s
accessibility to health care, in violation of
the Establishment Clause. After establishing the overreach of the exemption,
opponents must argue that the interests
behind providing contraceptive coverage
are significant and worthy of governmental action. This should be accomplished by
pointing out that coverage of contraceptives is fundamentally a question of civil
rights and equal protection under the law.
For this contention, opponents
should point to a key Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) ruling in
December 2000. In this case, the EEOC
(2000) mandated that employers who
provided prescription drug coverage to
their employees must also cover contraceptive methods, lest they be found in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act. Title VII prevents discrimination on
the basis of sex. This argument should
be extended to the present-day scenario. Refusing to cover contraceptive methUMURJ | Volume III | Spring 2019

ods, which are both a critical component
of female preventive care and a facilitator
of unobstructed female participation and
advancement in the workforce, solely penalizes women and puts female employees ata disadvantage in comparison to
their malecounterparts.

Conclusion
This paper outlined each phase of
litigation surrounding the contraceptive
mandate of the ACA: for-profit companies
demanding an accommodation, nonprofits demanding an exemption, state attorneys general opposing expanded exemptions, and future litigants likely to emerge
after the passage of the final rules, just last
week. It then addressed the remaining judicial questions the Supreme Court will be
ultimately responsible for resolving and discussed potential precedent today’s plaintiffs should consider employing. Now, I turn
to the more fundamental issue of women’s
health becoming both a political pawn and
a matter whose quality is so closely tied to
unaffected persons in power. I remind the
reader to remember that women’s access
to contraceptives is not merely a matter
of Constitutional language, administrative jargon, and bureaucratic loopholes. A
woman’s decision to use contraceptives is
one often approached with great consideration, as she weighs the hormonal imbalance some methods could impose uponher body with her desire to live without
fear of becoming pregnant, thus altering
the course of her life. It is maddening and
terrifying, then, if a woman must also be
forced to consider if her government will
suddenly decide that she is not entitled to
those contraceptives anylonger.
Therefore, once all of the judicial
backlash has quelled, we must revisit the
Grant, The Case for Contraceptives

question of severity regarding whether
women’s health meets parity with the permanence of the regulations surrounding it.
Further, we must reevaluate how we balance our priorities. As noted by Stahl &
Lynch (2017), religion is something that is
fundamentally pervasive and guiding in a
person’s life—but then, of course, so is that
person’s health. Why have we convinced
ourselves it is necessary to sacrifice one for
the other?
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